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Abstract 
This paper introduces consumption externalities into a Ramsey-type model with endogenous 
labour supply and homogeneous agents. The instantaneous utility of any consumer is 
assumed to depend on work effort, own consumption and relative consumption, where the 
latter determines the individual's status in the society. Appropriate normality conditions with 
respect to consumption and leisure ensure that at least in the long run status-conscious 
individuals consume and work too much, compared to the social optimum, and that the 
capital stock is too high. Public policy can, however, induce the private sector to attain the 
social optimum by designing an optimal consumption tax policy.  
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1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to investigate the in°uence of consumption externalities
in a standard version of the Ramsey model with an endogenous labour supply
decision. Speci¯cally, we introduce consumption externalities into the representa-
tive agent's instantaneous utility function, which depends on own consumption,
work e®ort, and relative consumption. This speci¯cation expresses two ideas: i)
economic agents care about their relative position in society, and ii) social status
is determined by relative consumption.1 The major innovation in our paper is to
model employment as a choice variable. The alternative approach is to treat work
e®ort as a ¯xed variable and has been used by authors such as Rauscher (1997b),
Hof (1999a), and Fisher and Hof (2000).2 Our extension allows us to consider
whether status-conscious people work \too much" or \too little", compared to
some hypothetical social optimum.
The rationale for studying the in°uence of status preference in a dynamic
framework is to investigate the divergent short and long-run e®ects that this
preference has on the economy's development. For instance, a preference for rel-
ative consumption may, depending on the speci¯c economic setting, stimulate
short-run consumption at the expense of long-run consumption, or vice-versa.
We will show in this paper that the impact of status on the economy's macroe-
conomic dynamics depends crucially on the endogenous response of employment.
In particular, we will prove that if work e®ort is endogenously determined, then
not only the dynamic behavior of the economy is a®ected by a preference for sta-
tus, but also the properties of its stationary equilibrium. Appropriate normality
conditions with respect to consumption and leisure are su±cient to demonstrate
that status-conscious individuals, at least in the long run, consume and work too
much and accumulate an excessive stock of physical capital, compared to a hypo-
thetical social optimum.3 The government, nevertheless, can induce the private
sector to attain the social optimum by designing an optimal consumption tax
policy.4 We will calculate an optimal consumption tax in which the tax rate is a
function of the average level of consumption and average hours worked. We can
further illustrate that there exist quite standard speci¯cations of the instanta-
1An alternative branch of this literature models status as determined by relative wealth
rather than by relative consumption. This approach is employed by Corneo and Jeanne (1997),
Rauscher (1997a), and Futagami and Shibata (1998).
2In Persson (1995) labour supply is also treated as endogenously determined. In contrast
to our work in which attention will be restricted to the case of homogeneous agents, Persson
considers heterogeneous agents, but neglects any intertemporal considerations.
3In models with ¯xed employment, such as Rauscher (1997b), Hof (1999a), and Fisher and
Hof (2000), the equilibrium values of consumption and capital in the stationary steady state are
independent of consumption externalities, although these authors do show that these externali-
ties may in°uence the economy's speed of transitional adjustment.
4Hof (1999a) and Fisher and Hof (2000) have shown in the ¯xed employment case that there
exist several quite general types of instantaneous utility functions in which the decentralized
solution equals its corresponding socially optimal counterpart in spite of the existence of con-
sumption externalities. This situation eliminates, of course, the need for optimal government
intervention.
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neous utility function in which the optimal tax rate is constant over time and
depends positively on the degree of agents' status-consciousness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the basic
model, while section 3 derives the intertemporal equilibrium of the planned and
the decentralized macroeconomy. Using two di®erent utility functions, we then
illustrate in section 4 the results of the preceding section. Section 5 derives the
optimal consumption tax policy, while section 6 contains some brief concluding
remarks. The paper closes with an appendix that contains some mathematical
results and proofs.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by a large number of identical, in¯nitely-lived individ-
uals. For simplicity, we assume that the population size remains constant over
time. As is usual in the Ramsey framework, we restrict attention to the case
in which agents possess perfect foresight. The representative individual chooses
paths of consumption and leisure in order to maximize discounted intertemporal
utility, which is given byZ 1
0
e¡½tu (c (t) ; l (t) ; z (t))dt; z (t) ´ c (t) =C (t) ;
where ½ is the constant rate of time preference and u denotes the instantaneous
utility function. We assume that the instantaneous utility of the representative in-
dividual depends on his absolute consumption, c, work e®ort (measured by hours
worked), l, and relative consumption, z ´ c=C, where C denotes the average (or
per capita) consumption in the economy.5 This speci¯cation of u implies that in
our model an individual's status is solely determined by his relative consump-
tion. In other words, consumption is treated as a positional good, while leisure is
assumed to be a non-positional good.6 We further assume that u possesses con-
tinuous ¯rst-order and second-order partial derivatives that have the following
signs
uc > 0; ucc < 0; ul < 0; ull < 0; uz > 0; uzz < 0; (1)
where we de¯ne u over the following inequalities: c > 0; 0 < l < lmax and c=C > 0,
where lmax is exogenously given. According to (1), the representative individual
derives positive and diminishing marginal utility from both own and relative con-
sumption, in addition to positive and increasing marginal disutility from work-
ing, (i.e., positive, but diminishing, marginal utility from leisure). In order to
obtain a well-behaved optimization problem we will assume that the function
U (c; l; C) ´ u (c; l; c=C) is strictly concave in (c; l). Observe that the expression
Uc = uc + C
¡1uz > 0 measures the total marginal utility of own consumption.
5The variable z is introduced for notational convenience. The partial derivative u(c=C)(c=C),
for instance, is represented by uzz.
6See Frank (1985) for a discussion of positional goods.
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In other words, a rise in c, for given values of l and C, leads to an increase in
both own and relative consumption. In order to ensure that U (c; l; C) is strictly
concave in (c; l), we introduce the following additional assumptions:
Ucc = ucc + 2C
¡1ucz + C¡2uzz < 0;
UccUll ¡ U2cl =
³
ucc + 2C
¡1ucz + C¡2uzz
´
ull ¡
³
ucl + C
¡1uzl
´2
> 0.
Finally, we let
(MRS)d (c; l; C) ´ ¡Uc (c; l; C)
Ul (c; l; C)
= ¡uc (c; l; c=C) + C
¡1uz (c; l; c=C)
ul (c; l; c=C)
(in the paper the superscript d stands for \decentralized") denote the marginal
rate of substitution of consumption for leisure as perceived by the representative
consumer who treats the average level of consumption in the economy, C, as
given. We will assume that (MRS)d depends negatively on own consumption
c and positively on leisure for any given level of average consumption in the
economy, C, i.e., (MRS)dc (c; l; C) < 0 and (MRS)
d
l (c; l; C) < 0. In other words,
we assume that both own consumption and leisure are normal goods. Further
assumptions with respect to u and U , respectively, will be introduced below.
In this simple framework we specify that individuals own the economy's phys-
ical capital, the services of which are rented to ¯rms in a perfectly competitive
capital market that yields a real return of r. In addition, the representative in-
dividual supplies l units of labour services per unit of time and receives the real
wage w, which is determined in a perfectly competitive labour market. Individ-
uals can lend to and borrow from other individuals. Since physical capital and
loans are assumed to be perfect substitutes as stores of value, they must pay the
same real return of r. The °ow budget constraint of the representative agent is
then given by
_a = ra + wl ¡ c; (2)
where a denotes the representative agent's stock of net assets, consisting of physi-
cal capital k and net loans b. We will assume that k (0) = k0 > 0 and b (0) = b0 = 0
so that a (0) = k0, where k0 is exogenously given and positive. We further as-
sume that the credit market imposes the following no-Ponzi-game condition on
the agent's borrowing:
lim
t!1
½
a (t) exp
·
¡
Z t
0
r (v) dv
¸¾
¸ 0. (3)
Since agents in our model are identical in every respect, the representative agent
will end up holding zero net loans in any symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium,
which implies that a = k ¸ 0.
With respect to the production sector, we assume that there is large number
of perfectly competitive ¯rms that rent the services of physical capital (which
does not depreciate) and labour to produce output. Each ¯rm has access to the
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same production possibilities, although technology itself does not improve. The
production function y = F (k; l) (using y to denote output) is assumed to have
the usual neoclassical properties of positive and diminishing marginal produc-
tivity with respect to capital and labour and is homogeneous of degree one. We
have now prepared all prerequisites for analysing the decentralized solution. To
consider whether the introduction of relative consumption into the instantaneous
utility function leads to Pareto nonoptimality, we will compare the decentralized
solution with the solution from a hypothetical social planner's problem. Since the
decentralized economy is more complicated than the command economy, we will
begin in the next section with the social planner's problem.
3 The Social Planner's Problem and the Decentral-
ized Solution
Suppose that there exists a benevolent social planner who dictates the choices of
consumption and hours worked over time and seeks to maximize the welfare of
the representative individual. Since individuals are identical, we assume that the
social planner assigns to each the same consumption level and the same level of
work e®ort. Consequently, c (t) = C (t) holds for all t, so that the instantaneous
utility of each individual becomes Us (c; l) ´ u (c; l; 1), where the superscript
s stands for \symmetric" case. It is clear that Usc = uc > 0, U
s
cc = ucc < 0,
Usl = ul < 0, and U
s
ll = ull < 0, where the signs hold due to the assumptions
made in (1). In order to ensure that Us (c; l) is jointly strictly concave in c and l,
we impose
ucc (c; l; 1)ull (c; l; 1) ¡ [ucl (c; l; 1)]2 > 0,
which implies that UsccU
s
ll ¡ (Uscl)2 > 0. Finally, let (MRS)p (in the paper the
superscript p stands for social \planner") denote the marginal rate of substitution
of leisure for consumption as perceived by the social planner, who ensures that
c = C for each individual. It is further assumed that the centralized marginal
rate of substitution, equal to
(MRS)p (c; l) ´ ¡U
s
c (c; l)
Usl (c; l)
= ¡uc (c; l; 1)
ul (c; l; 1)
depends negatively on consumption and positively on leisure, i.e., (MRS)pc (c; l) <
0 and (MRS)pl (c; l) < 0. In other words, we assume that both consumption
and leisure are normal goods with respect to the instantaneous utility function
Us (c; l) ´ u (c; l; 1).
The social planner then chooses the time paths of c and l to maximizeZ 1
0
e¡½tUs (c; l)dt =
Z 1
0
e¡½tu (c; l; 1)dt
subject to the economy's resource constraint
_k = F (k; l) ¡ c (4)
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and the initial condition k (0) = k0 > 0, where k0 is exogenously given. The
current-value Hamiltonian is given by
H = Us (c; l) + ¸ [F (k; l) ¡ c] = u (c; l; 1) + ¸ [F (k; l) ¡ c] ;
where the costate variable ¸ denotes the shadow price of capital. The necessary
conditions for (c; l; k) to be an optimal path are equal to
Usc (c; l) = uc (c; l; 1) = ¸; (5)
Usl (c; l) = ul (c; l; 1) = ¡¸Fl (k; l) ; (6)
_¸ = ¡ [Fk (k; l) ¡ ½] ¸: (7)
The transversality condition is given by
lim
t!1 e
¡½t¸k = 0. (8)
The assumptions made so far ensure that if (c; l; k) satis¯es (4), (5), (6), (7), (8)
and the initial condition k (0) = k0, then it is an optimal path.
In the decentralized economy the representative individual chooses the time
paths c and l to maximizeZ 1
0
e¡½tU (c; l; C)dt =
Z 1
0
e¡½tu (c; l; c=C)dt
subject to the °ow budget constraint (2), the no-Ponzi-game condition (3) and
the initial condition a (0) = k0. A crucial feature of this optimization problem is
that the representative agent takes not only the time paths of r and w, but also
the time path of C as given. In other words, each individual is small enough to
neglect his own contribution to the average consumption level in the economy.
The current-value Hamiltonian of this optimization problem is written as
H = U (c; l; C) + ¸ (ra + wl ¡ c) = u (c; l; c=C) + ¸ (ra + wl ¡ c) ;
where, as before, ¸ denotes the shadow price of wealth. The necessary conditions
for (c; l; a) to follow an optimal path are equal to
Uc (c; l; C) = uc (c; l; c=C) + C
¡1uz (c; l; c=C) = ¸; (9)
Ul (c; l; C) = ul (c; l; c=C) = ¡¸w; (10)
_¸ = ¡ (r ¡ ½)¸: (11)
The transversality condition given by
lim
t!1 e
¡½t¸a = 0 (12)
ensures that the no-Ponzi-game condition (3) holds with equality. If (c; l; a) sat-
is¯es (9), (10), (11), (12), (2), and the initial condition a (0) = k0, then it is an
optimal path.
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The next step in our analysis is to derive the symmetric macroeconomic equi-
libria for the decentralized economy. Since all individuals are identical, this means
that i) identical individuals make identical choices so that c = C, or z ´ c=C = 1
for all t, ii) each individual holds zero net loans so that net wealth is simply equal
to the capital stock, i.e., a = k, iii) the real rental rate and the real wage are de-
termined by the pro¯t-maximizing conditions r = Fk (k; l) and w = Fl (k; l), and
iv) the constant returns to scale assumption implies that F (k; l) = rk +wl. Sub-
stituting these relationships into (9), (10), (11), (12), (2), and the initial condition
a (0) = k0, the dynamic evolution of the decentralized economy is determined by
the optimality condition
uc (c; l; 1) + c
¡1uz (c; l; 1) = ¸ (13)
along with the optimality condition (6), the di®erential equations (7) and (4),
the transversality condition (8) and the initial condition k (0) = k0. Obviously,
the only di®erence between this system and the system which determines the
evolution of (c; l; k) in the socially planned economy is that (5) is replaced by
(13).
Note that the di®erential equations _¸ = ¡ [Fk (k; l) ¡ ½]¸ and _k = F (k; l)¡ c
are common to both the decentralized and the socially planned economies. Since,
in addition, the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, it is clear
that in steady state equilibrium, in which _k = _¸ = 0, the capital-labour ratio,
k=l, and the consumption-labour ratio, c=l, are equal in both economies and
determined by the following equations:
Fk (k=l; 1) = ½; c=l = F (k=l; 1) :
It follows that the decentralized steady state ratios, denoted by ~kd=~ld and ~cd=~ld,
are identical to their socially optimal counterparts, equal to ~kp=~lp and ~cp=~lp,
where the symbol » denotes a steady state value. In the following analysis we
will, however, show that while ~kd=~ld = ~kp=~lp and ~cd=~ld = ~cp=~lp, it is also the case
that ~ld > ~lp, ~cd > ~cp and ~kd > ~kp under plausible assumptions with respect to
preferences. This means that (at least) in the long run people work and consume
too much, and accumulate to much physical capital.
We will next study the dynamic behavior of both the decentralized and the
socially planned economy.7 The ¯rst step is to solve the necessary optimality
conditions, given by (5) and (6) in the centralized case and by (13) and (6) in
the decentralized case, for c and l. This yields
c = c^j (¸; k) ; l = l^j (¸; k) ; j = p; d; (14)
with the partial derivatives for the centralized economy, c^p and l^p, equal to
c^p¸ =
ull + uclFl + ¸Fll
Dp
; l^p¸ = ¡ulc + uccFlDp ;
c^pk =
ucl¸Flk
Dp
; l^pk = ¡ucc¸FlkDp ;
(15)
7For an account of this type of analysis, see Turnovsky (1995), Chapter 9, after p. 234.
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where Dp = ucc (ull + ¸Fll)¡u2cl > 0.8 Our assumptions concerning the properties
of the instantaneous utility function u and the production function F imply that
Dp > 0 and that the partial derivatives have the following signs:
c^p¸ < 0; l^
p
¸ > 0; sgn
¡
c^pk
¢
= sgn (ucl) ; l^
p
k > 0. (16)
Due to normality, both own consumption and leisure depend negatively on the
shadow price of capital ¸. Equally, work e®ort depends positively on ¸. Since
Fkl > 0 by assumption, a rise in capital k raises the marginal product of labour.
This e®ect causes labour (resp. leisure) to depend positively (resp. negatively)
on the capital stock. Own consumption depends negatively on the capital stock
if Uscl (c; l) = ucl (c; l; 1) < 0, i.e., if a rise in leisure increases the marginal utility
of own consumption Usc (c; l) = uc (c; l; 1). While Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)
and Turnovsky (1995) (in models without consumption externalities) consider
the case in which ucl < 0 to be intuitively more plausible, we will not rule out
the alternative that Uscl (c; l) = ucl (c; l; 1) > 0.
9
In the decentralized economy the partial derivatives of c^d and l^d are given by
c^d¸ =
ull +
³
ucl + c
¡1uzl
´
Fl + ¸Fll
Dd
;
l^d¸ = ¡
ucl +
³
ucc ¡ c¡2uz + c¡1uzc
´
Fl
Dd
;
c^dk =
³
ucl + c
¡1uzl
´
¸Fkl
Dd
; l^dk = ¡
³
ucc ¡ c¡2uz + c¡1uzc
´
¸Fkl
Dd
;
(17)
where Dd =
¡
ucc ¡ c¡2uz + c¡1uzc
¢
(ull + ¸Fll) ¡ ucl
¡
ucl + c
¡1uzl
¢
.10 Observe
that the signs of Dd, c^d¸, c^
d
k, l^
d
¸, and l^
d
k cannot be determined without introducing
further assumptions. For this reason, we assume ¯rst that³
ucc + c
¡1ucz ¡ c¡2uz
´
ull ¡
³
ucl + c
¡1uzl
´
ucl > 0: (18)
Loosely speaking, this condition ensures that individuals do not overreact to
changes in average consumption.11 We impose next an additional normal-
ity condition that the decentralized symmetric marginal rate of substitution
8In these expressions the second-order partial derivatives of u and F are evaluated at (c; l; 1) =¡
c^p (¸; k) ; l^p (¸; k) ; 1
¢
and (k; l) =
¡
k; l^p (¸; k)
¢
, respectively.
9The analysis becomes, nevertheless, much simpler under the assumption that ucl (c; l; 1) · 0.
One reason is that ucl (c; l; 1) · 0 is a su±cient (but not necessary) condition for normality.
10In these expressions c = c^d (¸; k), and the partial derivatives of u and F are evaluated at
(c; l; 1) =
¡
c^d (¸; k) ; l^d (¸; k) ; 1
¢
and (k; l) =
¡
k; l^d (¸; k)
¢
, respectively.
11The initial necessary optimality conditions of the representative individual's optimization
problem (9) and (10) can be solved for c and l in the form c = c^d1 (¸;w; C) and l = l^d1 (¸;w;C).
The inequality (18) ensures that c^d1C (¸;w; c) < 1, i.e., that the partial derivative of own con-
sumption c with respect to average consumption in the economy C is less than unity where
c = C holds. For a detailed discussion, see Hof (1999b).
7
(MRS)d (c; l; c) depends negatively on consumption c and positively on leisure,
i.e., (MRS)dc (c; l; c)+(MRS)
d
C (c; l; c) < 0 and (MRS)
d
l (c; l; c) < 0.
12 Finally, we
assume that the labour market exhibits Walras stability. Under these conditions
it follows that
Dd > 0; c^d¸ < 0; l^
d
¸ > 0; (19)
while the signs of c^dk and l^
d
k remain ambiguous.
Substituting (14) into (4) and (7), we obtain the dynamic system(s) that
jointly determines the evolution of k and ¸. It is equal to
_k = F
³
k; l^j (¸; k)
´
¡ c^j (¸; k)
_¸ = ¡
h
Fk
³
k; l^j (¸; k)
´
¡ ½
i
¸
j = p; d: (20)
Linearizing (20) about the steady states
³
~kj ; ~¸j
´
, j = p; d, the local dynamics
can be approximated by the following system of linear di®erential equations:0B@ _k
_¸
1CA =
0B@ !
j
11 !
j
12
¡~¸j!j21 ¡~¸j!j22
1CA
0B@ k ¡ ~kj
¸ ¡ ~¸j
1CA ; j = p; d; (21)
where
!j11 =
h
Fk + Fl l^
j
k ¡ c^jk
i
SSj
; !j12 =
h
Fl l^
j
¸ ¡ c^j¸
i
SSj
;
!j21 =
h
Fkk + Fkl l^
j
k
i
SSj
; !j22 =
h
Fkl l^
j
¸
i
SSj
;
(22)
and where [²]SSj indicates that the expressions between the brackets are evaluated
at the appropriate steady state. Substitution of (15) and (17), respectively, into
(22) yields the complete solutions of the !jim elements. These expressions are
stated in the appendix (see subsection 7.1). To examine the stability properties
of the two economies, we calculate the characteristic polynomial of (21), which is
equal to
P j (») ´ »2 ¡
³
!j11 ¡ ~¸j!j22
´
» ¡ ~¸j
³
!j11!
j
22 ¡ !j12!j21
´
= 0. (23)
Using the partial derivatives (16) and the expressions for the !pim elements given
in the appendix (see subsection 7.1), we can show that our assumptions made
with respect to preferences and technology are su±cient for
!p11 > 0; !
p
12 > 0; !
p
21 < 0; !
p
22 > 0. (24)
From (24) follows that the term ¡~¸p (!p11!p22 ¡ !p12!p21) is unambiguously nega-
tive, which implies that the roots, or eigenvalues, of the characteristic polynomial
12The ¯rst inequality means that if the economy moves from one symmetric situation to
another with a higher common level of consumption, then the marginal rate of substitution as
perceived by the representative consumer decreases.
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of the socially planned solution are of opposite sign, i.e., »p1 < 0 and »
p
2 > 0, and,
thus, that the centralized steady state equilibrium is a saddlepoint. Using the
expression given in the appendix it can be further shown that
!d12 > 0; !
d
21 < 0; !
d
22 > 0; ¡~¸d
³
!d11!
d
22 ¡ !d12!d21
´
< 0: (25)
Hence, the roots of the characteristic polynomial of the decentralized solution are
as well of opposite sign, i.e., »d1 < 0 and »
d
2 > 0. The stationary equilibrium of the
decentralized economy is, consequently, also a saddlepoint. Employing standard
methods and imposing the transversality condition, we can show that the solution
to (20) can be approximated by the following equations for j = p; d:
kj = ~kj +
³
k0 ¡ ~kj
´
exp
³
»j1t
´
;
¸j ¡ ~¸j = ¡ !
j
11 ¡ »j1
!j12
³
kj ¡ ~kj
´
= ¡
~¸j!j21
~¸j!j22 + »
j
1
³
kj ¡ ~kj
´
. (26)
Given !p11 > 0, !
p
12 > 0, and »
p
1 < 0, it is obvious from (26) that the stable
arm corresponding to the socially planned solution is negatively sloped in the
(k; ¸) plane. In other words, a rise in the capital stock is accompanied by a
decline in the its shadow value and that both adjust monotonically. What can
we infer concerning the slope of the stable arm of the decentralized economy? In
the appendix we demonstrate that !d11 ¡ »d1 > 0. Since, in addition, !d12 > 0 (see
(25)), it is clear from (26) that this stable arm is also negatively sloped in the
(k; ¸) plane.
What can be said about the optimal paths of own consumption and work
e®ort, cj and lj? Using (14), we can write the expressions for consumption and
leisure as cj = c^j
¡
¸j ; kj
¢
and lj = l^j
¡
¸j; kj
¢
, respectively. Consider, for instance,
the socially planned economy and assume that k0 < ~kp. In this case the transition
to the steady state is characterized by a rising capital stock k and a falling
shadow price of capital ¸. Using (16), we can infer that the fall in ¸ leads to an
increase in the optimal levels of consumption and leisure. In contrast, the rise
in k causes the optimal level of leisure to fall, while its e®ect on consumption is
ambiguous, since it depends on the sign of ucl. The direction of the net e®ects can
be determined, nevertheless, as follows: linearizing cj = c^j
¡
¸j; kj
¢
about steady
state and substituting (26), we obtain the (k; c) locus given by
cj ¡ ~cj = ¡
Ã
´j11 ¡ »j1
´j12
! ³
kj ¡ ~kj
´
; j = p; d,
where ´j1m, m = 1, 2 coe±cients are de¯ned in the appendix (see subsection
7.2). Since we can show that ´j11 > 0 and ´
j
12 < 0 for j = p; d, the stable locus
in the (k; c) plane is positively sloped in both economies, which implies that a
rise in the capital stock is accompanied by a rise in consumption if k0 < ~k
p.
Clearly, both the capital stock and consumption converge monotonically to their
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stationary values. Following the same procedure for labour, where lj = l^j
¡
¸j ; kj
¢
,
we cannot, however, determine whether lj rises or falls monotonically toward its
steady-state value.
The following proposition summarizes the results derived to this point and
states the key result of the paper that is proved in the appendix.
Proposition 1 Under the assumptions made above, the following results hold:
A) The steady-state values of the capital-labour ratio and the consumption-
labour ratio are identical in the two economies:
~kd=~ld = ~kp=~lp; ~cd=~ld = ~cp=~lp.
B) Both the centralized and the decentralized steady states are saddlepoints.
Furthermore, in both cases the stable arm exhibits the property that the
capital stock and consumption converge monotonically to their steady-state
levels such that the two variables always move in the same direction.
C) The optimal plan chosen by the benevolent social planner leads to a steady
state in which private individuals work and consume less and the capital
stock is lower than in decentralized economy:
~cp < ~cd; ~lp < ~ld; ~kp < ~kd.
Proposition 1 shows that at least in the long run status-conscious people work
and consume too much, and the capital stock is too high, compared to the social
optimum. We have shown both A) and B) above. The proof of C) is given in the
appendix (see subsection 7.3) and will be illustrated with two examples in the
next section.
4 Illustrations
4.1 Additively Separable Utility Function
In this subsection we analyze the case in which the instantaneous utility function
u takes the following additively separable form
u (c; l; z) = v (c; l) + ± ¢ s (z) ; (27)
where ± > 0 is a ¯xed preference parameter. The partial derivatives of the utility
functions v and s are assumed to have the following properties:
vc > 0; vcc < 0; vl < 0; vll < 0; vccvll ¡ v2cl > 0; s0 > 0; s00 < 0.
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To simplify the analysis, we will assume in this case that an increase in leisure
raises the marginal utility of own consumption, so that vcl < 0.
13 The decentral-
ized optimality conditions (13) and (6) become
vc (c; l) + c
¡1±s0 (1) = ¸; vl (c; l) = ¡¸Fl (k; l) ;
while their socially planned counterparts (5) and (6) are equal to
vc (c; l) = ¸; vl (c; l) = ¡¸Fl (k; l) .
It is clear that the decentralized economy coincides with the socially planned
solution if status does not play any role, i.e., if ± = 0.
We can show that the steady-state values of the decentralized economy's en-
dogenous variables depend crucially on the preference parameter for status, which
we specify as # ´ ±s0 (1). We can calculate the following comparative static ex-
pressions:
@
³
~kd=~ld
´
@#
=
@~rd
@#
=
@ ~wd
@#
= 0;
@~cd
@#
=
@~yd
@#
=
·
(F=l)Fl
G
¸
SSd
> 0
@~kd
@#
= ¡
·
FlFkl
FkkG
¸
SSd
> 0;
@~ld
@#
=
·
Fl
G
¸
SSd
> 0
where
G = ¡
n
(vll + vclFl) + (F=l)
h
vlc +
³
vcc ¡ c¡2#
´
Fl
io
c > 0:
According to these results the steady state has the following properties: i) the
capital-labour ratio, the real interest rate, and the real wage are independent of
# and ii) ~cd, ~yd, ~ld, and ~kd depend positively on #. Observe that the solution to
the social planner's problem coincides with the decentralized solution if ± = 0.
Since ± = 0 implies that # = 0, this is equivalent to ~xp = ~xd
¯¯¯
#=0
. Finally, since
@~cd=@# > 0, @~yd=@# > 0, @~kd=@# > 0, and @
³
~kd=~ld
´
=@# = 0, it is clear that:
~cp < ~cd; ~yp < ~yd; ~lp < ~ld; ~kp < ~kd; ~kp=~lp = ~kd=~ld.
In other words, private households in the stationary decentralized equilibrium
work and consume more, (and produce more output) than they do in the cen-
tralized case, as is maintained in part C of proposition 1.
4.2 An Isoelastic Utility Function
The utility function studied in the preceding subsection exhibits the property
that ulz = ucz = 0. In this subsection we consider a speci¯cation that permits
13If we, instead, allow vcl > 0, then further conditions must be imposed in order for (27) to
satisfy the assumptions made in our paper. See Hof (1999b) for further details.
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ucz 6= 0. Speci¯cally, we consider the utility function that is isoelastic in own and
relative consumption and separable in work e®ort
u =
1
1 ¡ µ
·³
c1¡¯z¯
´1¡µ ¡ 1¸ ¡ ¹l1+¾; µ > 0; ¹ > 0; ¾ > 0; 0 < ¯ < 1 (28)
where (28) satis¯es our curvature assumptions and the parameter ¯ represents
the agent's preference for status. If, in addition, the production function takes
the Cobb-Douglas form F (k; l) = Bk®l1¡a, with B > 0 and 0 < ® < 1, then
the steady-state values of c, l, and k are easily calculated. In particular, we can
show that ratios of decentralized to centralized consumption, work e®ort, physical
capital are equal and exceed unity according to the following relationship
~cd
~cp
=
~ld
~lp
=
~kd
~kp
=
µ
1
1 ¡ ¯
¶1=(¾+¯+(1¡¯)µ)
´ ª(¯; µ; ¾) > 1;
where the expressions for ~cp, ~lp, and ~kp are given in the appendix (see subsection
7.4) and ª (¯; µ; ¾) represents the scale factor according to which economic activ-
ity in the status-conscious economy rises relative to its socially planned counter-
part. It can be shown that ª (¯; µ; ¾) is greater, the larger is the status parameter
¯, the stronger is the willingness to shift consumption toward the future, which
is inversely related to µ, and weaker is disutility of work e®ort, which depends
positively on ¾.
5 Optimal Taxation
We will analyze in this section whether the social optimum can be attained in
the decentralized economy by means of optimal taxation. The key distortion
is that the willingness to substitute consumption for leisure is too high in the
decentralized economy, i.e.,
(MRS)d (c; l; c) =
Ã
uc (c; l; 1) + c¡1uz (c; l; 1)
uc (c; l; 1)
!
(MRS)p (c; l) > (MRS)p (c; l) .
An obvious policy response is to impose a tax on consumption, since it raises the
price of present consumption in terms of present as well as future leisure. If the
government imposes a consumption tax and returns lump-sum transfers, then the
°ow budget constraint of the representative household equals
_a = ra + wl ¡ c (1 + ¿) + T;
where ¿ and T denote the consumption tax rate and lump-sum transfers, respec-
tively. We assume that each individual takes not only the time path of C, but
also the time paths of ¿ and T as given. In the following, we will restrict attention
to symmetric macroeconomic equilibria in which the government runs a balanced
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budget for all t. In such a situation the conditions c = C and ¿c = T hold. In this
case the dynamic evolution of (c, l, k, ¸) is governed by the ¯rst-order condition
uc (c; l; 1) + c
¡1uz (c; l; 1) = ¸ (1 + ¿) (29)
along with the optimality condition (6), the di®erential equations (7) and (4), the
transversality condition (8) and the initial condition k (0) = k0. By introducing
the consumption tax, the only di®erence is that (13) is replaced by (29). The cru-
cial question is whether the social optimum can be attained in the decentralized
economy by choosing the consumption tax rate appropriately.
Proposition 2 If the government sets the consumption tax rate ¿ according to
¿ = ©(C; L) ´ uz (C;L; 1)
Cuc (C; L;1)
; (30)
where L denotes the average hours worked in the economy, then the social opti-
mum is attained by the decentralized economy.
The idea of the proof is as follows: Since the structures of the two economies
are identical, except with respect to optimality conditions for own consumption,
a tax policy which ensures that (29) is equivalent to (5), ensures that the decen-
tralized economy reproduces the social optimum. Assume that the government
sets ¿ according to (30). Since the representative individual takes the time paths
of C and L as given, he also takes the time path of ¿ = ©(C;L) as given. In
a symmetric equilibrium in which identical individuals make identical choices,
¿ = ©(c; l) holds. Substituting this relationship into (29) and rearranging we
obtain: µ
1 +
uz (c; l; 1)
cuc (c; l; 1)
¶
[uc (c; l; 1) ¡ ¸] = 0. (31)
Since uc > 0 and uz > 0, it is obvious that (31) is equivalent to (5), so that
uc (c; l; 1) = ¸. Hence, the tax policy given by (30) will ensure that the social
optimum is attained by the decentralized economy.
We will give two speci¯cations of the instantaneous utility function in which
the optimal tax rate is constant over time. First, if u takes the form
u (c; l; z) = ® ln c + g (l) + ±s (z) ; g0 < 0; g00 < 0; s0 > 0; s00 < 0;
which is a special case of (27), then uc (C; L;1) = ®C
¡1 and uz (C;L; 1) = #
where # ´ ±s0 (1). Substitution of this result into (30) yields ¿ = ©(C; L) = #=®.
This constant tax rate, which ensures that the social optimum is attained by the
decentralized economy, depends positively on both ± and s0 (1) and negatively on
®.
Next, if u takes the form given by (28), then
uc (C;L; 1) = (1 ¡ ¯)C¡[¯+(1¡¯)µ]; uz (C;L; 1) = ¯C¡[¯+(1¡¯)µ]:
Substitution of these results into (30) yields ¿ = ©(C;L) = ¯= (1 ¡ ¯). Obvi-
ously, the optimal tax rate is constant over time and depends positively on the
parameter ¯. It is zero if ¯ = 0, i.e., if relative consumption does not matter at
all, and tends to in¯nity as ¯ ! 1.
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6 Concluding Remarks
We have examined the e®ects of competition for status within a Ramsey-type
model in which labour supply is endogenously determined. In this model the
status of any individual is solely determined by his relative consumption. Appro-
priate normality conditions with respect to consumption and leisure ensure that
at least in the long run status-conscious individuals consume and work too much
and the capital stock is too high compared to the socially optimal solution. The
government can induce, however, the private sector to attain the social optimum
by designing an optimal consumption tax policy.
7 Appendix
7.1 The !jim elements
In this section of the appendix we give the expressions for the !jim elements of the
coe±cient matrix of the system (21), where i;m = 1; 2, j = p; d. For the planned,
or centralized economy, these are given by:
!p11 = ½ ¡ ~¸p
·
(uccFl + ucl)Flk
Dp
¸
SSp
> 0;
!p12 = ¡
·
(ulc + uccFl)Fl + (ull + uclFl) + ¸Fll
Dp
¸
SSp
> 0;
!p21 =
"
Fkk
¡
uccull ¡ u2cl
¢
Dp
#
SSp
< 0;
!p22 = ¡
·
Fkl (ulc + uccFl)
Dp
¸
SSp
> 0.
For the decentralized economy, these elements equal:
!d11 = ½ ¡ ~¸d
"
Fkl
£¡
ucc ¡ c¡2uz + c¡1uzc
¢
Fl +
¡
ucl + c
¡1uzl
¢¤
Dd
#
SSd
!d12 = ¡
"
Fl
£
ucl +
¡
ucc ¡ c¡2uz + c¡1uzc
¢
Fl
¤
+ ull +
¡
ucl + c
¡1uzl
¢
Fl + ¸Fll
Dd
#
SSd
!d21 =
"
Fkk
£¡
ucc ¡ c¡2uz + c¡1uzc
¢
ull ¡ ulc
¡
ucl + c
¡1uzl
¢¤
Dd
#
SSd
!d22 = ¡
"
Fkl
£
ucl +
¡
ucc ¡ c¡2uz + c¡1uzc
¢
Fl
¤
Dd
#
SSd
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We can show that the determinant of (21), ¡~¸d
³
!d11!
d
22 ¡ !d12!d21
´
, is equal to
¡~¸d
8<:
24Fkk (F=l) hulc + ³ucc ¡ c¡2uz + c¡1uzc´ Fli
Dd
35
SSd
+
24Fkk hull + ³ucl + c¡1uzl´ Fli
Dd
35
SSd
9=; < 0
Next, we will show that !d11¡ »d1 > 0. Since the steady state is a saddlepoint,
the characteristic polynomial (23) has the following properties:
P d (») > 0 , » < »d1 < 0 or » > »d2 > 0; P d (») < 0 , »d1 < » < »d2 (32)
From (25) and P d
³
!d11
´
= ~¸d!d12!
d
21 follows that P
d
³
!d11
´
< 0. Hence, according
to (32) we have shown that »d1 < !
d
11 < »
d
2 , which implies that !
d
11 ¡ »d1 > 0.
7.2 The ´j1m elements
Using the expressions for the partial derivatives c^p¸ and c^
p
k, (see (15)), and the
elements !p11 and !
p
12, given in subsection 7.1, we can calculate that ´
P
1m, m = 1,
2, are equal to:
´p11 = ½ ¡
·
¸FlFkl
ull + uclFl + ¸Fll
¸
SSp
;
´p12 = ¡
·
(ulc + uccFl)Fl + ull + uclFl + ¸Fll
ull + uclFl + ¸Fll
¸
SSp
.
The conditions for normality and the properties of the production function ensure
that ´p11 > 0 and ´
p
12 < 0.
Substituting for the partial derivatives c^d¸ and c^
d
k, (see (17)), and the elements
!d11 and !
d
12 stated above in subsection 7.1, we can show that:
´d11 = ½ ¡
·
¸FlFkl
ull + (ucl + c¡1uzl)Fl + ¸Fll
¸
SSd
;
´d12 = ¡
"£
ucl +
¡
ucc ¡ c¡2uz + c¡1uzc
¢
Fl
¤
Fl + ull +
¡
ucl + c
¡1uzl
¢
Fl + ¸Fll
ull + (ucl + c¡1uzl)Fl + ¸Fll
#
SSd
.
From normality and the properties of the production function, it follows that
´d11 > 0 and ´
d
12 < 0.
7.3 Proof of proposition 1 part C
In the socially planned economy the steady-state values of c, l, k, and ¸ are
obtained from the following equations:
uc
³
~cp;~lp; 1
´
¡ ~¸p = 0; (33)
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ul
³
~cp;~lp; 1
´
+ ~¸pFl
³
~kp; ~lp
´
= 0; (34)
½ = Fk
³
~kp; ~lp
´
; (35)
~cp = F
³
~kp; ~lp
´
: (36)
In the decentralized economy the corresponding steady-state values are deter-
mined by
uc
³
~cd;~ld; 1
´
+ uz
³
~cd; ~ld; 1
´ ³
1=~cd
´
¡ ~¸d = 0; (37)
ul
³
~cd; ~ld; 1
´
+ ~¸dFl
³
~kd; ~ld
´
= 0; (38)
½ = Fk
³
~kd; ~ld
´
; (39)
~cd = F
³
~kd; ~ld
´
: (40)
Since by assumption the production exhibits constant returns we have
F (k; l) = l ¢ f (k=l) ; (41)
Fk (k; l) = f
0 (k=l) ; (42)
Fl (k; l) = f (k=l) ¡ (k=l) ¢ f 0 (k=l) ; (43)
where f (k=l) ´ F (k=l; 1). From (35), (39), and (42), it follows that
~kd=~ld = ~kp=~lp = ·; · ´ ¡f 0¢¡1 (½) ; (44)
which implies that the steady-state values of the capital-labour ratios are identical
in the two economies. Using (36), (40), (41), and (44), we obtain
~cd=~ld = ~cp=~lp = f (·) : (45)
Using (43) and (44), we obtain
Fl
³
~kd; ~ld
´
= Fl
³
~kp;~lp
´
= Ã; Ã ´ f (·) ¡ ·f 0 (·) : (46)
From (33), (34), (45) and (46), it follows that ~lp is a solution to £1 (l)¡£2 (l) = 0,
where the functions £1 and £2 are de¯ned as
£1 (l) ´ ¡ (1=Ã)ul (l ¢ f (·) ; l; 1) > 0; £2 (l) ´ uc (l ¢ f (·) ; l; 1) > 0:
The ¯rst-order derivatives of £1 and £2 are given by
£01 (l) = ¡ (1=Ã) [ulc (l ¢ f (·) ; l; 1) f (·) + ull (l ¢ f (·) ; l; 1)] ;
£02 (l) = [ucc (l ¢ f (·) ; l; 1) f (·) + ucl (l ¢ f (·) ; l; 1)] :
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Hence,
£01
³
~lp
´
¡ £02
³
~lp
´
= ¡ 1
Ã
h
ulc
³
~lp ¢ f (·) ;~lp; 1
´
f (·) + ull
³
~lp ¢ f (·) ; ~lp; 1
´i
¡
h
ucc
³
~lp ¢ f (·) ; ~lp; 1
´
f (·) + ucl
³
~lp ¢ f (·) ; ~lp; 1
´i
:
Using Ã ´ f (·) ¡ ·f 0 (·), this result can be rewritten as
£01
³
~lp
´
¡ £02
³
~lp
´
(47)
= ¡ 1
Ã
h
ull
³
~lp ¢ f (·) ;~lp; 1
´
+ Ãucl
³
~lp ¢ f (·) ; ~lp; 1
´i
¡f (·)
Ã
h
ucl
³
~lp ¢ f (·) ; ~lp; 1
´
+ Ãucc
³
~lp ¢ f (·) ; ~lp; 1
´i
:
The normality assumption that the centralized marginal rate of substitution of
consumption for leisure (MRS)p (c; l) depends negatively on consumption and
positively on leisure implies that
ulc (c; l; 1)uc (c; l; 1) ¡ ul (c; l; 1)ucc (c; l; 1) < 0; (48)
ull (c; l; 1)uc (c; l; 1) ¡ ul (c; l; 1)ucl (c; l; 1) < 0: (49)
From (33), (34), and (46), it follows that
uc
³
~lp ¢ f (·) ; ~lp; 1
´
= ~¸p; ¡ul
³
~lp ¢ f (·) ; ~lp; 1
´
= Ã~¸p:
Substitution of these results into (48) and (49) yields
ucl
³
~lp ¢ f (·) ; ~lp; 1
´
+ Ãucc
³
~lp ¢ f (·) ; ~lp; 1
´
< 0; (50)
ull
³
~lp ¢ f (·) ; ~lp; 1
´
+ Ãucl
³
~lp ¢ f (·) ; ~lp; 1
´
< 0: (51)
From (47), (50), and (51), it follows that £01
³
~lp
´
¡ £02
³
~lp
´
> 0. Hence, if ~lp is a
solution to £1 (l)¡£2 (l) = 0, then £01
³
~lp
´
¡£02
³
~lp
´
> 0. In other words, at any
point of intersection with the horizontal axis, the function £1 (l) ¡ £2 (l) is posi-
tively sloped. Taking into account that the utility function as well as its ¯rst-order
and second-order partial derivatives are continuous functions by assumption, the
following result are obvious: If ~lp is a solution to £1 (l) ¡ £2 (l) = 0, then (a) it
is the unique solution, and (b)
£1 (l) ¡ £2 (l) > 0 , l > ~lp: (52)
From (37), (38), (45) and (46), it follows that ~ld is a solution to £1 (l) ¡
[£2 (l) + £3 (l)] = 0, where the function £3 is de¯ned as
£3 (l) ´ uz (l ¢ f (·) ; l; 1) 1
l ¢ f (·) > 0:
Hence, we have
£1
³
~ld
´
¡ £2
³
~ld
´
= £3
³
~ld
´
> 0: (53)
From (52) and (53) it is obvious that ~ld > ~lp. From (44) and (45) then follows
that ~kp < ~kd and ~cp < ~cd.
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7.4 Utility function (28) { The solutions for ~cp, ~lp, and ~kp
If u takes the form given by (28) and F takes the Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation
F (k; l) = Bk®l1¡®, we can then calculate the following stationary equilibrium
values of consumption, work e®ort, and the stock of capital for the socially
planned economy:
~cp =
Ã
¡
·
B
µ
®
½
¶®¸ 1+¾1¡®! 1¾+¯+(1¡¯)µ
; ~lp =
0@¡ ·B µ®
½
¶®¸ (1¡¯)(1¡µ)1¡® 1A 1¾+¯+(1¡¯)µ
~kp =
0@¡"B1+¾ µ®
½
¶¾+¯+(1¡¯)[®+µ(1¡®)]# 11¡®1A
1
¾+¯+(1¡¯)µ
; ¡ =
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¯)
¹(1 + ¾)
.
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